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EU Treaty 
Article 15 
1.   The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus 
for its development and shall define the general political directions and priorities 
thereof. It shall not exercise legislative functions. 
2.   The European Council shall consist of the Heads of State or Government of 
the Member States, together with its President and the President of the 
Commission. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy shall take part in its work. 
3.   The European Council shall meet twice every six months, convened by its 
President. When the agenda so requires, the members of the European 
Council may decide each to be assisted by a minister and, in the case of the 
President of the Commission, by a member of the Commission. When the 
situation so requires, the President shall convene a special meeting of the 
European Council. 
4.   Except where the Treaties provide otherwise, decisions of the European 
Council shall be taken by consensus. 
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Five critical decisions 
1. Shall we bail out Greece? 
2. Shall we have Eurobonds (2010)? 
3. Shall we have Eurobonds now (2014)? 
4. Shall we have the Fiscal Compact? 
5. Shall there be a government of the Eurozone with a single treasury? 
 
The German position of austerity in an intergovernmental setting: 
1. No (but if the alternative is the breakdown of the Euro: yes, with rigid 
conditions) 
2. No 
3. No 
4. Yes 
5. No 
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Research question & theory 
Who sided why with Germany? 
Our argument based on traditional intergouvernmentalism: States 
pursue their self-interest. If you are competitive you opt for austerity for 
others and fiscal discipline. If you are not competitive, you opt for 
demand-side measures and unconditional fiscal transfers. If you are in 
between, you are silent – you don‘t know where you will end up. 
This is non-trivial: 
Neofunctionalists/constructivists: a European project. The search 
for the best argument. Compromise after arguing. 
Liberal intergouvernmentalists: Governments care for their national 
banks (costs of Greek default).   
Democratic theory/electoral politics: governments represent the 
median voter. 
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Research design / analysis 
Expert survey / documents 
Measures:  
Follow Germany (from 0 to 5) 
Oppose Germany (from 0 to 5) 
Take no position (from 0 to 5) 
Agreement (Follow-oppose Germany) 
Rank order (Closeness to Germany. Top: NL, S; bottom: I) 
 
Bayesian regressions.  
DV: Follow Germany 
DV: Take a clear position vs. no position 
DV: Single items 
IV: Fiscal position (debt*interest), current account, support for austerity, 
exposure to bad debt. 
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Results 
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Conclusion 
Tell me your fiscal position and your current account balance 
and I tell you your position in the European Council on austerity 
measures. 
 
Very little evidence that median voters, powerful economic 
interests, normative support of European integration matter 
more. 
 
Most worrying: Most governments said nothing and followed the 
crowd. No discussion on the national level on major decisions 
which directly affect welfare state and economic governance.  
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